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Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice, by Francis J. 
Beckwith. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xv + 296. $75.00 (cloth); 
$29.99 (paper).
ROBERT N. WENNBERG, westmont College
This is a full-bore, take-no-prisoners defense of the claim that from con-
ception the unborn are full-fledged members of the human community, 
possessing an unqualified right to life, the same right to life that you or 
I possess. Reasons, both popular and scholarly, that have been advanced 
for “abortion choice” are examined and confidently rejected. Beckwith 
crosses swords with multiple pro-choice opponents: popularizers, aca-
demics, jurists, philosophers, those sophisticated about these matters and 
those not.
So many arguments are looked at and dispatched one after another that 
no author could be expected to always get it right. This is a passionate and 
highly polemical work. The text is filled with “each reason is seriously 
flawed,” “he commits two fallacies,” “this is absurd,” “the reasoning is 
circular,” “she stipulates its truth and provides no arguments,” “this argu-
ment begs the question,” and so on. It breathes fire and confidence from 
beginning to end. Yet some of Beckwith’s most interesting arguments are 
in support of the claim that the pro-life position only needs to be judged 
reasonable, not conclusive, not a hands down winner, in order to justify a 
pro-life stance in law and morality. Though Beckwith is himself a person 
of Christian faith and no doubt well acquainted with the theological give 
and take on the abortion issue, the arguments he presents on behalf of 
his pro-life position intentionally make no reference to theological con-
siderations. This is done in order to deflect the widespread but certainly 
erroneous charge that the pro-life position is nothing more than an ex-
pression of religious faith, which, for those who make this charge, often 
means that it is nothing more than religious dogma unsupported by the 
kind of reasons that can be taken into the public arena to shape our laws 
and challenge the beliefs of those who don’t share a religious pro-life per-
spective. Beckwith, in the course of making his case, interacts with a wide 
range of literature. Indeed, unusual for a book published by a major uni-
versity publishing house is his engagement not only with the standard 
professional sources, which is extensive, but also with writings from Bak-
er, Christian Scholar’s Review, eerdmans, Fleming H. revell, InterVarsity, 
Presbyterian and Reformed, and Zondervan. For most academics writing 
about abortion, this is unknown territory. The book is filled with thought 
experiments designed to show that our intuitions actually favor a right to 
life from conception. So if you enjoy puzzling over fictional scenarios to 
test your intuitions, this is the book for you.
As to be expected, Beckwith is critical of the Roe v. Wade decision legal-
izing abortion. This decision, he argues, is filled with confusions, logical 
errors and factual mistakes. Contrary to how the Supreme Court argued, 
uncertainty over the moral status of the unborn actually favors criminal-
izing abortion because for all we know we might be killing an individual 
with a right to life. The possibility of such a grave offence should have 
prompted the court to err on the side of life, not choice. It is the legalization 
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of abortion, not its criminalization, that requires a clear consensus and 
arguments compelling to all, which obviously we lack.
Beckwith also sets his sights on those philosophers who have similarly 
argued that uncertainty over when the right to life begins favors liberty 
and the right to choose. In this regard Beckwith examines and rejects an 
argument offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson, which comes with a recom-
mendation by John Rawls. The crucial premise in Thomson’s argument 
is that “severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of 
considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting.” 
Since the pro-choice advocate is not unreasonable in rejecting the claim 
that there is a right to life from conception (nor, as Thomson also acknowl-
edges, is the pro-lifer unreasonable in rejecting the pro-choicer’s denial of 
such a right to life), it follows that legally preventing them from having an 
abortion is unjustified. In short, uncertainty favors liberty which in turn 
favors abortion choice.
Beckwith’s response to Thomson is once more to argue that consider-
ations of liberty are outweighed by the reasonable possibility that abor-
tion involves the horrendous evil of killing an innocent individual with a 
right to life. In support of this claim, Beckwith offers us one of his many 
thought experiments. A man has been convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death based on a single piece of DNA evidence. A few months later it 
is discovered that the convicted man has a twin, who lacks an alibi and 
has, of course, identical DNA. Consequently there is a 50 / 50 chance that 
the convicted twin is not guilty. While we do know that one of the two is 
guilty, we do not know which one it is. We would not proceed with the 
execution of the convicted twin, nor therefore should we proceed to legal-
ize abortion and risk that 50 / 50 chance that we would be involved in an 
unjustified homicide. Therefore, the liberty to kill the unborn ought to be 
constrained by law, should it be judged that the pro-life position is at least 
as reasonable as its denial. Moreover, such considerations favor not only 
criminalizing abortion but also making personal choices that favor life. 
For one ought not to risk killing by means of abortion what might be an 
innocent human life in order to eliminate certain burdens that one would 
otherwise have to bear, anymore than one would seek to remove the same 
or comparable burdens by performing an action that has, say, a 1 in 10 
chance of killing a “perfectly healthy and innocent” eight-year-old child.
At the heart of Beckwith’s book is the claim that from conception there 
is a human being with a “full right to life” or, as he also puts it, a human 
being that is “intrinsically valuable.” The right to life or intrinsic value 
is possessed by the conceptus because from the moment of conception 
we have a rational moral agent by nature or, as Beckwith also puts it, we 
have a unique and special substance, a rational-moral-agent substance. In 
the case of a human substance those capacities have to do with rational 
moral agency, but they do not need to be exercisable at a given moment, 
as with the reversibly comatose, nor do they have to be developed to the 
point where they can be exercised, as with the unborn and neonates, in 
order for the individual to be a rational agent by nature and therefore 
to have intrinsic value and a full right to life. These are, to say the least, 
controversial claims, but Beckwith argues that the substance view is to be 
preferred to those alternative views of personhood that render abortion 
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a morally permissible activity. But why is the substance view to be pre-
ferred? Beckwith does not engage in an extended discussion of the meta-
physics of personhood to support this claim. His comments in this regard 
are relatively brief. what he does argue at greater length is that the alter-
native views have counter-intuitive implications whereas his substance 
view does not have those implications or at least they are less serious and 
less objectionable. Of course, it could be said that it is counter-intuitive to 
conclude, as Beckwith does, that using the IUD or the morning after pill, 
which are abortifacient, are as morally objectionable as killing the person 
sitting next to you. Invoking such intuitions to counter Beckwith’s posi-
tion would be dismissed by Beckwith as begging the question.
What is needed, then, are cases where most people agree as to their mo-
rality but where only one theory can adequately account for that shared 
moral response and where there is no begging of the question. This is 
going to be a challenging task, but this is what Beckwith sets himself to 
carry out offering us a number of thought experiments to demonstrate the 
superiority of his view of personhood. So to give but one example, he of-
fers for our consideration the proposal that scientists manipulate an early 
embryo-clone in such a way that an infant without higher brain functions 
is produced and whose body parts can then be harvested to save other 
lives. We would, of course, be morally repelled by such a proposal. He 
then argues that only on his substance view can we account for this intu-
ition, that the clone is entitled to its higher brain functions. But we might 
wonder whether Beckwith’s theory of personhood involves some moral 
over-determination. For on his substance view it would be as morally ob-
jectionable to deprive the clone of its higher brain functioning in order to 
help others as it would be to remove Beckwith’s brain sans consent and use 
his body parts for transplant purposes. But it doesn’t seem to be that bad.
Another object of Beckwith’s criticism are those who, like Judith Jarvis 
Thompson with her well-known case of the unconscious violinist, have 
argued that the right to life of the fetus does not include the right to reside 
in the woman’s body without her consent, and therefore abortion is not 
a violation of a right to life. In essence, as Beckwith construes matters, 
Thomson and those of a similar conviction are maintaining
that it is permissible to engage in a pleasurable act whose design 
is to bring into existence a vulnerable, defenseless, and dependent 
human person, and if such a person comes into existence, one of the 
persons responsible for its existence and who is in a unique position 
to care and nurture it can then destroy it without any justification 
except as an act of will. (p. 180)
In contrast to this, Beckwith argues that consent-to-sex entails consent-
to-pregnancy whether or not the woman intended to get pregnant. Argu-
ments to the contrary are examined and rejected. In engaging in sexual 
intercourse, he contends, one engages in an act that is ordered or designed 
to bring into existence persons needy by nature, temporarily dependent 
as they are upon the woman’s body for their survival. And when a person 
is responsible for another’s “neediness” one has a special obligation to 
provide appropriate assistance. The pregnant woman, it is concluded, has 
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a special obligation to bring the unborn to term. In addition to this special 
obligation there is the general obligation not to kill the innocent, and it is 
that obligation that renders abortion morally unacceptable even when the 
pregnancy is due to rape. Individuals who are conceived by rape, whether 
born or unborn, are as much holders of a right to life as any one else and 
their right to life must also be fully honored. That a pregnancy is due to 
rape does not render abortion morally acceptable nor should it be made 
legal. This also holds for pregnancy due to incest or a combination of incest 
and rape. Here, as elsewhere, Beckwith demonstrates his moral tough-
mindedness. He doesn’t blink at drawing the hard conclusion required by 
his theory of personhood. (Another example of this tough-mindedness is 
his rejection of stem cell research.)
However, to claim as Thomson and others have that the right to life does 
not include the right of the fetus to temporarily reside for life-sustaining 
purposes in the woman’s body is not incompatible with the claim that the 
woman ought not to have an abortion and that she acts wrongly if she 
does. Here one may have a right to do what one ought not to do. To dem-
onstrate the immorality of abortion is not to demonstrate that abortion 
involves the violation of a right of such a nature that it necessitates legally 
requiring the woman to keep the unborn in her womb and thereby force 
her to do what we might very well judge she freely ought to do. There is 
perhaps some sentiment behind this conviction when we reflect on our 
hesitancy (a hesitancy that perhaps some can overcome) to legally coerce 
a person to give blood (or a spare vital organ) that is desperately needed 
to save another’s life even when it was criminal violence or negligence on 
the part of the potential blood donor (or potential vital organ donor) that 
caused the other person’s neediness. (Suppose the two share a rare blood 
type and other blood donors are unavailable.)
Beckwith’s book is not a simple academic exercise. There is too much 
at stake for it to be just that, and Beckwith is an ardent pro-lifer with an 
eye well beyond the narrow confines of the academy. Whereas Beckwith’s 
slashing polemical style may be off-putting to some, it does speak of deep 
caring about the sanctity of unborn human life. He is certainly seeking 
to convince and convert. But for many, conversion will not come easily. 
For they will find certain basic implications of the pro-life position hard 
to believe, maybe even unbelievable. For example, the use of the IUD 
and the morning after pill, as mentioned, is rendered as wrong as kill-
ing an eight-year-old child, possibly to be put in the same legal category 
as murder or manslaughter, with appropriate punishment to be meted 
out to guilty offenders. Those who draw back at this implication do not 
necessarily believe that the IUD and the morning after pill are nothing 
more than innocent contraceptive devices, but neither do they believe 
that repeated and knowledgeable users of these abortifacient products 
are serial killers or their near moral neighbors. And it’s getting over this 
hump that is essential—and a big hump it is—if they are to be brought 
into the pro-life fold.
Beckwith’s book will undoubtedly come under sustained critical attack 
if for no other reason than it is at odds with the prevailing orthodoxy in 
the academy. Nevertheless, it might be hoped that it will serve to engen-
der some doubt and critical reflection among those who are perhaps a bit 
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too confident in their “abortion choice” beliefs. Wherever the truth lies in 
this contentious matter, it is not to be found in association with the easy 
conscience over the practice of abortion that characterizes so many in our 
culture. We may hope, therefore, that Beckwith’s book will prick a con-
science or two. The abortion debate should not go away and Beckwith has 
made a significant contribution to seeing that it doesn’t.
Developmental Theism: From Pure will to Unbounded Love by Peter Forrest. 
Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 199. $55 (cloth).
DANIeL DOMbrOwSkI, Seattle University
Both the existence and the concept of God are examined in this thought-
provoking book. The author’s treatment of the existence of God is built 
foursquare on a philosophical anthropology. There is a spectrum of phil-
osophical positions regarding what human beings are: reductive mate-
rialism sees consciousness and agency (the mental) as redundant of the 
physical; moderate materialism sees the mental as nonredundant of the 
physical, but as nonetheless correlated with the physical in a metaphysi-
cally necessary fashion; moderate idealism sees the physical as nonre-
dundant of the mental, but as nonetheless correlated with the mental in a 
metaphysically necessary fashion; reductive idealism sees the physical as 
redundant of the mental; and, of course, dualism sees the mental and the 
physical as correlated only contingently.
Forrest thinks that the probability of theism is negligible only if we are 
almost certain of reductive materialism. That is, we have good reason to 
be theists. But the author does not so much think that we should be confi-
dent theists as we should not be confident atheists.
Among the options in philosophical anthropology listed in the first 
paragraph, it is moderate materialism that Forrest defends, a position that 
coheres with theism better than its chief rival, dualism. Because of the cur-
rent dominance of materialism in philosophy, he thinks that philosophical 
theists should pay attention to a type of theism that is built on a moderate 
materialist basis. One beneficial consequence of a theism that is built on 
moderate materialism is that it avoids talking of miraculous intervention 
into the natural world by a supernatural God. It is precisely this sort of 
talk that often prevents philosophical theists from getting a fair hearing. 
(Forrest’s previous book was titled God without the Supernatural: A Defense 
of Naturalistic Theism.)
Most of the book, however, concerns not the existence of God, but the 
concept of God. God changes, on Forrest’s view, such that the history of re-
ligious thought can exhibit genuine, if uneven, progress just as the history 
of scientific thought can do so. Although he acknowledges that many of 
his views are like those of Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, 
and David Ray Griffin (indeed, he calls his position neoclassical theism, 
which is a Hartshornian commonplace), he does not really engage with 
process thinkers is any significant way. Rather, he reaches his conclusions 
